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Abstract
According to Lucas (1981) understanding business cycles is the first step in designing
appropriate stabilization policies. In this paper, we demonstrate a series of ways in
which developing countries differ from their developed counterparts when focus is on
the nature and characteristics of macroeconomic fluctuations. Cycles are shorter, making
it necessary to modify the filtering procedures normally applied for industrialized
countries. This leads to different stylized facts of the business cycle across countries and
regions, and the developing countries are more diverse than the rather uniform
industrialized countries. Great care is therefore needed when the causal mechanisms in
economic models are specified. A “one-size fits all” approach is unlikely to be
appropriate.
Outline
1. Introduction
2. Business Cycle Duration and De-Trending
3. Business Cycle Dates and Duration in Developing Countries
4. Stylized Facts Revised
5. Discussion and Conclusion
1I.   INTRODUCTION
The widespread use of traditional Keynesian models in combination with the Phillips-
curve to study business cycle fluctuations was severely challenged in the early 1970s. The
new classical school pointed repeatedly to the missing microeconomic foundation.
Subsequent critique of the new classical theories was, in turn, focused on the fact that they
were unable to satisfactorily explain observed fluctuations in the industrialized
economies. Nevertheless, the debate about the new classical revival helped resurrect
business cycle analysis and stimulate the development of both the new Keynesian school
and the Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory.
In recent years, focus has been on how well the new Keynesian and RBC models explain
the so-called stylized facts of business cycles. Yet, existing literature is almost exclusively
concerned with developed countries. Only scant attention has so far been paid to
macroeconomic fluctuations in developing countries, the notable exceptions being
Agénor, McDermott and Prasad (2000) and Pallage and Robe (2001).1 In these
contributions, it is assumed that the length of the cycles is comparable to the duration in
developed countries. In this paper, we investigate whether this assumption is valid based
on a sample of 15 developing countries. Verifying the correct duration of macroeconomic
fluctuations is critical. The stylized facts that emerge from simple business cycle analysis
are very sensitive to the chosen distinction between business cycles and the underlying
growth performance.
Analyzing business cycles is useful for a variety of reasons. Canova (1998a, 1998b)
highlights that such insights may guide researchers in choosing leading indicators for
economic activity, and provide a set of “regularities” which macroeconomists can use as a
benchmark to examine the validity of numerical versions of theoretical models. Burnside
(1998) agrees with Canova on this point, and furthermore discusses the importance of
applying more than one filter when de-trending is undertaken. When data are de-trended
information is lost, and the nature of the information lost depends on the filter used. Any
                                                
1  Agénor, McDermott and Prasad (2000) have 12 developing countries (mainly middle-income countries) in their sample
from which stylized facts are derived for 14 indicators. Pallage and Robe (2001) have 63 countries in their sample but only
consider stylized facts related to foreign aid, including multilateral and bilateral aid and commitments as well as
disbursements.
2filter has the potential of masking differences between models and data. In this paper, we
therefore apply both the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) and the Band-Pass (BP) filter. Burnside
and Canova do not agree, however, on the existence of a single set of stylized facts about
business cycles. We do not pretend to enter this long-standing controversy. We adopt
instead the taxonomy proposed by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
and derive a set of stylized facts covering 15 indicators for 50 developing countries. They
turn out to be clearly different from those of industrialized countries.
The paper is organized in five sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 provides an
overview of the methodology used to estimate the duration of the business cycles. The de-
trending procedures are also described in some detail. Section 3 goes on to document our
estimates of the duration and turning points of the business cycles in developing
countries, and in Section 4 we derive the implications hereof for the stylized facts. Section
5 concludes and discusses the implications for future research.
II. BUSINESS CYCLE DURATION AND DE-TRENDING
In their seminal contribution to the so-called classical business cycle literature, Burns and
Mitchell (1946) define business cycles as follows:
Business cycles are a type of fluctuations found in the aggregate economic activity
of nations that organize their work mainly in business enterprises: a cycle consists of
expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic activities, followed
by similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals which merge into the
expansion phase of the next cycle; this sequence of changes is recurrent but not
periodic; in duration business cycles vary from more than one year to ten or twelve
years; they are not divisible into shorter cycles of similar character with amplitudes
approximating their own (Burns and Mitchell, 1946, p. 3).
Based on this general approach, researchers at the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) have for some 75 years worked on the identification of business cycle turning
points in a model free environment.2 Using monthly series on output, income,
employment and trade for an increasing number of sectors, cyclical peaks and troughs
have been estimated for each series using a variety of estimation techniques.
                                                
2 See http://www.nber.org/cycles.html and Mitchell (1927).
3Supplementing all this with qualitative judgments on the persistence and seriousness of
cyclical movements across sectors has formed the basis for the identification of common
turning points, including their dates.3 It is the latter summary information on the aggregate
business cycles that is made publicly available.
The classical methodology of Burns and Mitchell (1946) and the NBER is complex and
demanding in terms of analytical capacity. Bry and Boschan (1971) therefore simplified
it, and the proposed Bry and Boschan (BB) procedure is based on a single reference series
(typically real GDP). The adherent analytical steps and set of decision rules for selecting
turning points in the business cycles are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Bry and Boschan (BB) procedure for programmed determination of turning points
1. Determination of extremes and substitution of values
2. Determination of cycles in twelve month moving average (extremes replaced).
A: Identification of higher (or lower) than five months on either side.
B: Enforcement of alternation of turns by selecting highest of multiple peaks (or lowest of multiple
troughs).
3. Determination of corresponding turns in Spencer curve (extremes replaced).
A: Identification of highest (or lowest) value within +/- five months of selected turn in twelve month
moving average.
B: Enforcement of minimum cycle duration of fifteen months by eliminating lower peaks and higher
troughs of shorter cycles.
4. Determination of corresponding turns in short-term moving average of three to six months,
depending on months of cyclical dominance (MCD).
A: Identification of highest (or lowest) value within +/- five months of selected turn in Spencer
curve.
5. Determination of turning points in unsmoothed series.
A: Identification of highest (or lowest) value within +/- four months, or MCD term, whichever is
larger, of selected turn in short term moving average.
B: Elimination of turns within six months of beginning and end of series.
C: Elimination of peaks (or troughs) at both ends of series which are lower (or higher) than values
closer to the end.
D: Elimination of cycles whose duration is less than fifteen months.
E: Elimination of phases whose duration is less than five months.
6. Statement of final turning points.
Source: Bry and Boshan (1971, p. 21).
                                                                                                                                          
3 A contraction period is defined as the time from peak to trough of a cycle. Similarly, an expansion period is defined as the
time between trough and peak.
4All classical views of macroeconomic fluctuations involve an analysis of total
increases/declines in output and/or other indicators over a given time period independent
of the underlying nature of the change. In contrast, a competing approach in the business
cycle literature, which we will tentatively refer to as the modern approach, has focused on
the cyclical fluctuations in economic time series data around their long run trends. These
short-term fluctuations are often referred to as growth cycles, and they are identified
through the application of a trend adjustment procedure. Burns and Mitchell (1946) argue
against the use of such trend adjusted data. De-trending may involve the loss of critical
information. Stock and Watson (1999) document that the focus on growth cycles (i.e., the
cyclical part of macroeconomic changes over time) has both advantages and
disadvantages as compared to the classical attention to aggregate changes. They recognize
that ignoring the trend (or the cyclical component) is inconsistent with various economic
models. For example, in traditional growth models productivity shocks determine both the
long run economic path and cycles around this trend. On the other hand, growth cycle
analysis may well be more robust (and useful for policy purposes) when the underlying
trend growth rate in the economy is separated out.4
Modern studies of the properties of business cycles have generally relied on linear filters
to separate trend and cyclical components. The standard procedure is therefore to de-trend
the data series using some approximation to an ideal filter and subsequently compute
sample second moments based on the cyclical component. Most researchers have used
either the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) or the Band-Pass
(BP) filter (Baxter and King, 1998). As compared to a standard first differencing filter, the
more complex HP-filter has the advantage that it does not amplify high frequency noise.
Nevertheless, a drawback is that the HP-filter at the same time allows much of the high
frequency noise to be left outside the business cycle frequency band. The low pass BP-
filter has been adjusted to take account of this problem,5 but it has a tendency to
underestimate the cyclical component. In our analysis we therefore use both the HP and
                                                
4 Stock and Watson (1999, p. 9) illustrate this with reference to post-war Japan, which has experienced very high growth
rates and few absolute declines (and thus few classical business cycles). Nevertheless, Japan has experienced various policy
relevant growth cycles.
5 This is done using a twelve quarter centered moving average, where weights are chosen so as to minimize the
squared difference between the optimal and the approximate filters, subject to the constraint that the filter has
zero gain at frequency zero. See Stock and Watson (1999, p. 12) for a good illustrative description of how the
different filters work.
5the BP filters to accommodate the debate between Canova (1998a, 1998b) and Burnside
(1998) on appropriate filters.
After the revival of interest in business cycle research following Kydland and Prescott
(1982) an enormous amount of research has been based on an eight-year distinction
between business cycles and growth. Moreover, both the HP and the BP filters are
designed to cut off low frequency cycles of more than 32 quarters duration. This implies
that a smoothing parameter (λ) is chosen for the HP-filter so λ = 1600 and λ = 100 when
seasonally adjusted quarterly and annual data are used, respectively. While it is common
to define modern business cycles as fluctuations in economic time series with a
periodicity of eight years or less, there is limited empirical evidence for this practice when
it comes to industrialized countries. While the choice of eight years may be appropriate in
the case of the US, studies concerning OECD countries suggest that six years is likely to
be a more appropriate duration of the business cycles (Pedersen, 1998). Different
smoothing parameters are therefore called for.
For developing countries, we know of no study that has tried to estimate the duration of
the business cycles, and they may well be different from those of developed countries.
Relying on the above smoothing parameters when studying poor countries is therefore at
best ad hoc, and may lead to inappropriate conclusions as regards the summary statistics
(or stylized facts) that characterize macroeconomic fluctuations.6 In the extreme,
inappropriate numerical models might be validated and vice versa, depending on the
choice of smoothing parameter. We therefore move on to estimate the duration of the
business cycles in 15 developing countries.
III.  BUSINESS CYCLE DATES AND DURATION IN DEVELOPING
        COUNTRIES
To estimate the duration of business cycles, their turning points must be identified. For
this we apply the BB-procedure, programmed in MATLAB,7 on the 15 countries in our
                                                
6 Choosing a smaller value of the smoothing parameter removes a larger part of the variance of the series since more low
frequency movements are filtered away. As a consequence, the standard deviation can be significantly affected. The
smoothing parameter also affects the computed second moments, implying that it may be important whether business cycles
are defined as cycles with a duration of less than eight years or less than six or seven years.
7 The computer code can be obtained from the authors on request.
6sample. They include five Sub-Saharan African countries, five from Latin America, and
five from Asia and North Africa as shown in Table 2.8 Because of the difficulty of
obtaining reliable quarterly GDP data for all of the countries in the sample, we use
indexes of industrial production as a proxy for the aggregate business cycle. We therefore
follow Agénor, McDermott and Prasad (2000), who argue that because output in the
industrial sector corresponds roughly to output in the traded goods sector and is closely
related to business cycle shocks for the countries analyzed, this variable is a reasonable
proxy for measuring the aggregate business cycle. The primary data source is the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS), where real
output data are approximated by either the industrial production or the manufacturing
production index. Data are available for varying time periods in the 15 countries, but the
period 1980-99 is well covered across countries. Results are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Duration of the business cycle for 15 developing countries (in quarters)
Region Country
Period
(Q=quarter)
Average
expansion length
Average
contraction length
Average length of
the business cycle
Sub-Sah. Africa South Africa 61,Q1-99,Q4 5.8 5.9 11.8
Malawi 70,Q1-99,Q4 5.9 5.4 12.0
Nigeria 70,Q1-99,Q4 4.0 5.5 9.5
Cote d´Ivoire 68,Q1-99,Q4 4.8 4.8 9.7
Zimbabwe 78,Q1-99,Q4 5.1 5.3 10.4
Latin America Uruguay 79,Q1-99,Q4 4.9 4.3 9.1
Columbia 80,Q1-98,Q4 5.0 4.7 9.7
Peru 79,Q1-99,Q4 4.6 4.3 9.4
Chile 60,Q1-99,Q4 3.7 3.8 7.8
Mexico 60,Q1-99,Q3 4.8 4.7 9.5
Asia and N. Africa India 60,Q1-99,Q4 3.1 4.7 8.1
Korea 60,Q1-99,Q4 6.3 10.4 18.1
Morocco 60,Q1-99,Q4 3.7 4.0 7.7
Pakistan 70,Q3-99,Q4 5.4 5.8 11.2
Malaysia 70,Q1-99,Q4 4.2 4.9 9.6
All Countries All 4.8 5.2 10.2
Notes: Because of missing data for some quarters for Zimbabwe and Cote d´Ivoire, some adjustments had
to be made for these two countries in order to estimate the duration of the business cycle using the Bry
and Boschan procedure.
                                                
8 The countries from North Africa should clearly not be grouped with Sub-Saharan Africa due to major differences in
economic indicators. To facilitate the presentation of our results they have been grouped under the heading of Asia and
North Africa.
7For Latin American countries the average length of the expansion periods is longer than
the contraction period, whereas the opposite is characteristic for Asian and North African
countries in the sample. It is more difficult to find a pattern in the business cycle duration
for Sub-Saharan African countries. Yet, it does appear that the average duration of the
business cycle is longer than in the other regions. Generally, it is clear from this analysis
that the average length of the business cycle for all developing countries is only between
seven and 18 quarters, equivalent to no more than four and a half years. While some
variation exists, a period of up to eight years duration cannot be justified. Taking account
of the standard deviation of the results (no more than five quarters), six years is a more
appropriate choice as upper limit.
Following Pedersen (1998) this has two important implications. When the cyclical
component has cycles with less than six years duration and when the near integrated time
series are filtered, the optimal value of the smoothing parameter (λ) for the HP-filter is
between 310 and 340. Setting λ = 1600 will lead to distorted results. Similarly, also the
BP-filter should be configured differently to reflect the appropriate cycle duration.
Next, consider the actual peaks and troughs for the 15 developing countries in our sample
as reported in Table 3-5. The interesting questions in the present context are whether (i)
the timing of recessions and booms are independent across the 15 countries in the sample
(i.e., whether there is a common business cycle), and (ii) how business cycles in
developing countries are related to cycles in the industrialized countries. Artis,
Kontolemis and Osborn (1997) find relatively synchronous peaks/troughs in the years
1973-74, 1979-80 and 1989-90 for G7 and European countries. It is evident that the first
two of these turning points reflect the two international oil crises, and the last episode
seems correlated with the collapse of Eastern Europe. Besides these three events not much
is apparent in terms of common business cycle features in the industrialized countries.
Table 3 documents the peaks and troughs during the period 1980-98 for the five Sub-
Saharan African countries. It appears that the second oil crisis and related events affected
these countries with a lag as compared to the trough in the industrialized countries.
Nevertheless, country specific circumstances appear to have played some role in the more
specific timing of the beginning of the recession that is not quite as regular as in the Latin
8American sub-sample, as discussed below.9 The turning points of the business cycles in
Sub-Saharan African countries vary considerably, though a common trough is evident in
1985, reflecting the general economic depression in Africa during the 1980s. In South
Africa recessions got shorter during the period 1980-98, but business cycle features for
Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire did not change much during the sample period.
Thus, no improvement took place, and in the case of Malawi, the duration of recessions
even increased, confirming the troubling difficulties experienced by Malawi (see IMF,
2001b, and Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1991).
Table 3. Peaks and troughs for Sub-Saharan African countries 1980-98
South Africa Malawi Nigeria Cote d´Ivoire Zimbabwe
Peak/Trough 81,Q4 - 83,Q1 80,Q3 - 82,Q1 81,Q1 - 83,Q1 81,Q1 - 82,Q4 82,Q2 - 83,Q1
Peak/Trough 84,Q2 - 85,Q3 83,Q3 - 85,Q1 84,Q1 - 85,Q2 84,Q1 - 85,Q3 84,Q1 - 85,Q4
Peak/Trough 86,Q3 - 87,Q2 86,Q3 - 88,Q1 86,Q1 - 86,Q4 86,Q2 - 87,Q3 86,Q3 - 88,Q1
Peak/Trough 88,Q1 - 89,Q1 89,Q3 - 91,Q1 87,Q4 - 90,Q2 89,Q1 - 90,Q3 89,Q1 - 90,Q1
Peak/Trough 90,Q1 - 91,Q1 92,Q3 - 94,Q2 91,Q2 - 92,Q3 92,Q1 - 93,Q3 90,Q4 - 93,Q1
Peak/Trough 92,Q4 - 94,Q2 95,Q3 - 97,Q2 93,Q4 - 94,Q4 94,Q4 - 95,Q3 93,Q4 - 95,Q1
Peak/Trough 95,Q3 - 96,Q4 95,Q4 - 96,Q3 96,Q2 - 97,Q3
Turning now to the Latin American countries in Table 4, they also experienced a
common, lagged trough following the second oil crisis as compared to the industrialized
countries. The synchronized trough in the Latin American countries took place in 1982.
But otherwise the turning points for the individual countries seem country specific.
Consistent with the average results in Table 2 the expansion periods are longer for
Uruguay, Peru and Mexico during 1980-98 than the contraction periods. However the
recessions clearly got shorter in Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s as compared with
recessions in the 1960s and 1970s. Whether this is due to improved economic policy,
exogenous factors or some combination hereof is an issue we will not pursue further here,
but see for example Giugale, Lafourcade and Nguyen (2001) and Lustig and Ros (1993).
Columbia experienced recessions and expansions during 1980-98 of almost identical
duration, whereas Chile had much shorter recession periods as compared with earlier
decades. This fits well with prior insights about the Chilean economic performance
                                                
9 Data do not allow systematic comparison with experiences following the first oil crisis for Sub-Saharan Africa, but
scattered observations not reported here seem to indicate that this variability (i.e. the timing of the onset of the recession in
individual countries) was even more pronounced in the early 1970s.
9discussed in Solimano (1993) and IMF (2001a). All in all, when the time period for the
analysis of Latin American countries is shortened, it becomes clearer that the average
expansion periods are longer than the average contraction periods, reflecting improved
economic performance in more recent years.
Table 4. Peaks and troughs for Latin American countries 1980-98
Uruguay Columbia Peru Chile Mexico
Peak/Trough 80,Q3 - 82,Q1 80,Q4 - 82,Q1 80,Q4 - 82,Q1 80,Q4 - 82,Q1 81,Q3 - 83,Q1
Peak/Trough 83,Q4 - 84,Q3 83,Q4 - 85,Q1 83,Q4 - 85,Q2 83,Q2 - 84,Q1 85,Q3 - 86,Q3
Peak/Trough 85,Q3 - 87,Q1 86,Q3 - 88,Q1 86,Q4 - 89,Q1 85,Q3 - 86,Q3 87,Q2 - 88,Q1
Peak/Trough 88,Q4 - 89,Q3 89,Q3 - 90,Q3 89,Q4 - 90,Q3 87,Q2 - 88,Q1 88,Q4 - 89,Q3
Peak/Trough 90,Q4 - 92,Q1 91,Q4 - 93,Q1 91,Q2 - 92,Q3 88,Q4 - 89,Q3 90,Q4 - 91,Q3
Peak/Trough 92,Q4 - 94,Q1 93,Q1 - 95,Q1 94,Q2 - 95,Q1 90,Q2 - 91,Q1 92,Q2 - 93,Q1
Peak/Trough 94,Q4 - 95,Q3 95,Q4 - 96,Q3 95,Q4 - 96,Q3 91,Q4 - 93,Q1 93,Q4 - 94,Q3
Peak/Trough 96,Q4 - 97,Q3 94,Q2 - 95,Q3
The business cycles of Asian and North African countries included in Table 5 were
influenced by the oil crisis at very different points in time. The relevant dates are almost
randomly distributed. It would clearly be interesting to expand the sample to see whether
this observation is robust, but the necessary data are not available. In addition, it is only in
the case of Malaysia that shorter recession periods were experienced during the period
1980-98 as compared with previous decades.
Table 5. Peaks and troughs for Asian and North African countries 1980-98
India Korea Morocco Pakistan Malaysia
Peak/Trough 80,Q1 - 81,Q2 81,Q4 - 85,Q1 80,Q4 - 81,Q3 80,Q1 - 81,Q3 82,Q3 - 83,Q4
Peak/Trough 82,Q1 - 83,Q2 87,Q2 - 88,Q2 82,Q2 - 83,Q1 82,Q2 - 83,Q3 85,Q4 - 87,Q1
Peak/Trough 84,Q1 - 85,Q2 90,Q3 - 92,Q3 83,Q4 - 84,Q3 85,Q1 - 86,Q2 87,Q4 - 89,Q1
Peak/Trough 86,Q1 - 87,Q2 93,Q2 - 94,Q1 85,Q2 - 86,Q1 87,Q1 - 88,Q3 89,Q4 - 91,Q2
Peak/Trough 88,Q1 - 89,Q2 94,Q4 - 98,Q2 86,Q4 - 89,Q1 90,Q1 - 91,Q3 92,Q4 - 94,Q4
Peak/Trough 90,Q1 - 91,Q2 89,Q4 - 90,Q3 93,Q1 - 94,Q3 95,Q4 - 97,Q1
Peak/Trough 92,Q1 - 93,Q2 91,Q4 - 92,Q3 96,Q1 - 97,Q3
Peak/Trough 94,Q1 - 95,Q1 93,Q4 - 95,Q1
Peak/Trough 96,Q1 - 97,Q3 95,Q4 - 97,Q1
The very frequent and long duration of recession periods in the countries in this sample
may appear somewhat surprising as they are generally considered relatively well-
managed economies. This highlights that business cycle analysis based on turning points
10
does not capture the depth and shape of the downturn, and similarly for the upturn.10 To
illustrate this point consider Figure 1 where two recessions with different duration are
shown. It is clear that the cumulated welfare loss shown as areas A and B are not
necessarily different. In other words, it cannot (as often done) be concluded that countries
experiencing long recession periods have greater output loss than countries with shorter
recession periods. It may well be more critical to avoid deep recessions. This underscores
the importance of distinguishing between different kinds of recessions (including both
duration and amplitude) when economic policy advice is formulated.
All in all it can be concluded that the developing countries in our sample were influenced
differently in terms of timing (i.e., with a lag) by the second oil crisis than the
industrialized countries. This suggests that business cycles in developing countries may
well be as much a result of recessions in the industrialized countries as a consequence of
the original international crisis itself. This hypothesis about the vulnerability of
developing countries is supported by Kouparitsas (2001). He evaluates the extent to
which macroeconomic fluctuations in developing non-oil producing countries are caused
by shocks originating in the industrialized countries. Based on a computable general
equilibrium model he finds a strong transmission mechanism of the business cycle. His
results indicate that fluctuations in output of the industrialized countries may well account
for about 70% of the variation in the consumption of developing countries.
Finally, our results document that the average duration of business cycles in developing
countries is shorter than in the industrialized countries. Developing countries are
different, and in general, they move relatively quickly from peak to trough and vice-versa.
This is costly as documented by Ramey and Ramey (1995) and clearly reflects the
insufficient capacity to counteract exogenous influences, including the limited extent of
automatic stabilization. In Section 4, we move on to derive the stylized facts that emerge
when the shorter business cycle duration is taken into account.
                                                
10 For an interesting study of the welfare losses incurred by 33 countries due to business cycles during the last three
decades see Pallage and Robe (2000).
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IV.  STYLIZED FACTS REVISED
In this section we apply the de-trending procedure described in Section 2 in combination
with the modified smoothing parameters, estimated from the results in Section 3. A
revised set of stylized facts emerges for 50 developing countries, including both low and
middle-income countries. Detailed results are presented for Latin America, Sub-Saharan
Africa and Asia and North Africa in a set of standard tables, including Table 6a and 6b to
11a and 11b, where a and b refers to the use of respectively the HP and the BP filter in the
de-trending procedure. Data sources include World Development Indicators (World Bank,
2000), Global Development Finance (World Bank, 2000), International Financial
Statistics (IMF, 2000), International Development Statistics (OECD, 2000) and
Macroeconomic Time-series from the World Bank WebPages.
(a)  Sub-Saharan Africa
A key issue concerning business cycle fluctuations in developing countries is whether
aggregate fluctuations in the various indicators are characterized by time series properties,
such as volatility and persistence, which are similar to the characteristics observed in
industrialized countries. Examining summary statistics for the filtered cyclical
components, it can be seen from Table 6a and 6b that volatility in the Sub-Saharan
African sample is much higher for all the 15 variables included here than the level
typically observed in developed countries.11  Moreover, the volatility of the cyclical
components obtained using the BP-filter is generally much lower than the standard
deviations estimated when using the HP-filter. The BP-filter eliminates some of the high-
frequency variation in the data, whereas the HP-filter only eliminates low-frequency
variation. The estimated volatility in Table 6a and 6b is significantly lower than in an
analysis where “standard” assumptions (i.e., using the eight year definition of the business
cycle discussed in Sections 2 and 3) about the smoothing parameters are used. The
relative volatility among the variables is more robust to changes in the smoothing
parameter.12
                                                
11 See Stock and Watson (1999) for detailed stylized facts of the US economy.
12 Because the HP and BP filters used in this paper tend to eliminate more of the low-frequency variation than a first
differencing procedure the standard deviations in Table 6a and 6b are generally lower than would be the case with a first
differencing filter. However the ordering of countries by their cyclical volatility is similar.
12
During the period 1967-97, a number of empirical business cycle regularities can be
identified for Sub-Saharan Africa. Output is generally much more volatile than that of
industrialized countries. However the magnitude of the standard deviations of output in
Sub-Saharan Africa is much less than that reported by Pallage and Robe (2001). They
estimate that shocks to poor countries are about six times more severe than shocks to
industrialized countries. Our result indicate that the volatility of output is only about 3-4
times that of developed countries. This highlights that the choice of smoothing parameter
is indeed an important one.
Considering some of the other variables the highly volatile nature of private investment,
money stock (M2), official development assistance (ODA) and credit to the private sector
stand out. All of the variables mentioned have very high standard deviations relative to
GDP. This reflects the evident vulnerability of African economies when it comes to
exogenous factors as well as variables that can be affected more directly by policy.
Another characteristic in the data is that consumption is more volatile than output. This
suggests that the consumption smoothing inherent in the permanent income hypothesis
appears absent in Sub-Saharan Africa in contrast to empirical evidence available for the
industrialized countries. It should be kept in mind, though, that the consumption figure
documented here includes both consumption of services and consumption of durables.
The latter is typically more volatile than GDP and other consumption indicators and is
therefore considered separately when data for developed countries are analyzed with
reference to the permanent income hypothesis. This is not possible here due the nature of
the data available.
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Table 6.a. Standard deviations for Sub - Saharan Africa, HP, percent
Gdp Abs Con Pco Pub Inv Imp Exp M2 Oda Tot Rer Cpi Cre Wag
Benin 2.86 4.16 3.79 3.85 8.80 20.53 13.91 15.95 11.79 15.58 9.21 na na 17.59 na
Burkina F 2.43 3.85 3.89 4.18 8.39 14.49 10.40 12.52 14.58 14.39 9.85 na na 21.79 na
Burundi 3.56 3.83 4.71 4.65 13.27 24.60 8.43 11.15 na 13.07 24.89 6.59 5.05 23.04 na
Cameroon 4.28 6.44 6.65 7.27 7.65 11.43 9.41 10.71 9.41 20.18 13.69 na na 16.61 na
Congo 4.17 5.44 5.35 6.55 21.89 24.70 17.76 15.96 na 22.74 14.50 na 76.51 na na
C. dIvoire 3.73 7.37 5.92 6.00 8.04 22.11 9.28 8.86 15.76 20.37 16.99 14.04 4.80 16.69 na
Gabon 10.68 13.96 6.84 9.37 12.82 30.03 17.69 10.71 17.55 24.03 16.38 12.22 7.01 17.08 na
Gambia 2.57 8.20 8.16 9.17 9.33 16.51 11.93 12.76 11.05 27.13 12.18 7.55 7.57 16.89 na
Ghana 3.95 5.33 5.07 5.75 9.31 16.33 13.66 10.76 10.74 26.16 11.84 28.79 13.11 20.52 na
Kenya 3.94 6.00 6.50 7.85 4.19 14.97 12.11 5.67 11.95 14.59 9.88 7.14 6.93 13.92 na
Madagasc. 3.01 4.66 3.57 3.61 5.04 19.19 12.77 9.08 11.50 20.54 7.75 8.30 6.90 12.33 na
Malawi 3.88 5.72 4.79 7.46 7.93 19.88 11.02 8.88 8.58 17.51 9.04 na na 20.18 na
Mali 4.15 4.22 4.47 4.65 9.97 10.98 9.81 6.86 14.51 17.86 6.81 na na 21.35 na
Niger 6.18 8.95 9.05 11.17 9.86 35.43 13.43 14.10 16.87 18.84 12.98 11.11 6.26 18.95 na
Nigeria 4.41 7.62 8.33 8.92 14.69 15.57 13.53 13.75 17.17 24.56 17.51 19.02 9.13 18.17 na
Rwanda 11.41 6.87 7.26 6.84 23.02 15.21 13.73 18.78 11.63 14.27 20.30 na na 20.17 na
Senegal 3.38 2.28 2.34 2.60 2.63 9.50 5.16 10.13 14.12 20.08 4.84 12.28 6.52 17.71 na
S. Africa 3.16 5.01 2.04 2.55 1.97 13.27 9.10 3.46 10.67 na 6.46 8.95 1.73 na na
Zambia 2.43 6.85 7.06 13.00 18.75 12.73 11.21 8.31 na 25.90 19.04 na na na na
Zimbabwe 5.10 4.95 7.60 9.55 12.26 14.19 Na na na 41.15 na 6.46 4.79 na na
Notes: Gdp = Real gross domestic product, Abs = Real domestic absorption, Con = Real total consumption, Pco = Real private
consumption, Pub = Real general government consumption, Inv = Real gross domestic investment, Imp = Real imports of goods and
services, Exp = Real exports of goods and services, M2 = Nominal money and quasi money (M2), Oda = Official development
assistance, Tot = Terms of trade index, Rer = Real effective exchange rate index, Cpi = Consumer price index, Cre = Private sector
credit , Wag = Nominal wage index. Data sources include WDI (2000), GDF (2000), IDS (2000), IFS (2000) and Macro Time Series
from www.worldbank.org/research/growth/
Table 6.b. Standard deviations for Sub - Saharan Africa, BP, percent
Gdp Abs Con Pco Pub Inv Imp Exp M2 Oda Tot Rer Cpi Cre Wag
Benin 1.79 2.46 2.75 2.94 5.24 11.55 8.83 8.77 8.78 11.24 6.62 na na 12.65 na
Burkina F 1.90 2.63 2.52 2.74 5.80 9.28 7.17 8.15 6.42 8.21 6.53 na na 8.30 na
Burundi 2.46 2.63 3.35 3.41 9.08 19.78 5.52 9.36 na 8.76 17.22 4.20 3.01 14.47 na
Cameroon 2.90 4.25 4.33 4.70 4.98 7.21 6.33 7.29 4.62 13.20 11.30 na na 9.41 na
Congo 1.75 2.73 2.28 3.25 17.16 19.20 9.98 8.47 na 11.79 9.59 na 34.03 na na
C. dIvoire 1.96 3.86 3.30 3.25 5.04 14.07 5.43 5.34 7.87 12.99 8.26 7.42 2.50 9.09 na
Gabon 5.28 7.23 5.29 7.12 7.47 17.74 9.77 5.59 7.93 18.90 9.29 7.22 4.00 9.28 na
Gambia 1.54 3.18 3.23 3.59 4.37 8.63 4.33 5.31 6.61 18.56 6.82 4.24 3.16 11.79 na
Ghana 2.33 3.88 3.40 3.71 6.46 12.80 8.61 8.16 6.63 18.91 9.12 13.93 7.73 13.71 na
Kenya 2.14 3.09 4.14 4.92 2.51 10.62 7.33 4.50 6.17 6.91 6.10 4.46 3.01 8.10 na
Madagasc. 1.89 2.87 2.11 2.22 2.69 12.95 8.09 5.51 6.59 10.51 3.51 5.85 3.07 7.36 na
Malawi 2.66 4.19 3.74 5.86 5.01 14.89 8.06 6.72 4.72 11.04 5.18 na na 8.10 na
Mali 2.56 2.62 2.91 3.02 7.16 7.00 6.53 5.11 8.02 10.65 4.29 na na 14.25 na
Niger 3.54 5.96 6.81 8.13 5.38 23.53 8.66 11.32 7.24 13.13 9.00 6.38 3.70 9.71 na
Nigeria 2.98 4.47 5.57 5.93 9.62 8.38 7.68 8.30 9.84 15.45 12.54 10.87 5.65 11.89 na
Rwanda 8.08 4.49 4.54 4.22 15.83 11.05 9.60 14.03 6.13 9.91 14.06 na na 15.33 na
Senegal 2.46 1.54 1.48 1.70 1.68 6.33 3.44 6.97 8.32 14.08 3.76 7.23 3.34 10.32 na
S. Africa 1.85 3.02 0.98 1.17 1.27 8.32 5.98 1.89 5.54 na 3.40 5.61 0.79 na na
Zambia 1.69 4.19 4.56 7.78 10.73 8.83 7.25 5.85 na 16.22 13.29 na na na na
Zimbabwe 2.41 2.32 4.16 5.40 8.43 7.79 na na na 25.78 na 3.62 2.19 na na
Notes: See Table 6.a.
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Turning now to analyzing cross correlations between GDP and other variables, Agénor,
McDermott and Prasad (2000) define a series as pro-cyclical, a-cyclical, or counter-
cyclical when the contemporaneous correlation coefficient is respectively positive, zero,
and negative. In addition, the series is thought of as significantly contemporaneously
correlated when 0.26 < X < 1.00, where X represents the cross correlation coefficient
between GDP and the other variable involved.
The relationship between business cycle fluctuations in aggregate output and the different
components of aggregate demand is well documented for developed countries. This has
not so far been the case for developing countries. From Table 7a and 7b it can be seen that
there is a robust positive relationship between consumption, both total and private, and
domestic output in Sub- Saharan African countries. The magnitude of the correlations is
in line with that observed in industrialized countries, and there are few exceptions. Data
from Gabon and Gambia point in the direction of counter-cyclical consumption, and
Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe show signs of a weaker relationship between
consumption and output than documented for the rest of the region and the industrialized
countries. The general picture is however clear.
There is also a strongly positive contemporaneous correlation between de-trended
investment and GDP data in almost all the Sub-Saharan African countries, and this is
independent of the type of filter used. This observation is not different from what is
observed in industrialized countries, and indicates that investment and GDP are indeed
positively related to each other. The only outlier is Kenya, where there is an insignificant
negative correlation between investment and output when looking at the band pass filtered
time series.
The relationship between government expenditure and GDP often attracts considerable
attention, inter alia because of the desire to ensure that fiscal policies help stabilize the
economy. We find indications of a positive relationship between government expenditure
and output for most of the countries in the Sub-Saharan African sample. There is therefore
no evidence of a counter-cyclical role of the government’s fiscal policy in the present
data, although some countries show signs of a negative relationship between government
purchases and output. In contrast to the finding of Agénor, McDermott and Prasad (2000),
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we would argue that fiscal policy needs reform before it is likely to have the desired
contra-cyclical and stabilizing effect in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Turning next to the relationship between domestic business cycles and fluctuations in the
variables relevant to international trade, Table 7a and 7b document a strongly positive
relationship between imports and output in almost all of the Sub-Saharan African
countries in our sample. In contrast, exports do not appear significantly correlated with
the aggregate business cycle. This implies that foreign trade on balance would appear to
be counter-cyclical, a characteristic also prevalent in developed countries. Exceptions
include Nigeria where there are signs of a positive correlation between the trade balance
and output, in all likelihood due to the substantial significance of oil exports in GDP.
Another exception is Rwanda.
Focusing on the correlation between the terms of trade index and output, it is difficult to
identify a general pattern for the countries studied here within the short-term framework
of business cycle analysis. In industrialized countries it is common to find a positive
correlation between lagged values of the terms of trade index and domestic output, and
Agénor, McDermott and Prasad (2000) also report that the terms of trade are strongly
related to output in their more limited sample, representing in particular middle-income
countries. Our data do not support that terms of trade disturbances can in general explain
business cycle fluctuations in output in Sub-Saharan African countries. Interestingly, for
example South Africa and Nigeria are cases where a positive relationship can be
identified. Yet, insignificant correlations are common and signs change when the filter
applied changes. This puts the complexity of the terms of trade and output relationship in
poor Sub-Saharan African countries into perspective and suggests that it is likely that
quantity changes in imports and exports in response to price changes did indeed take
place during the period under study. Nevertheless, responses clearly did differ from, for
example, the first to the second oil crisis due to the difference in the availability of foreign
exchange. All this therefore highlights that it is wise to study specific episodes and
countries carefully before general conclusions are attempted, remembering that there are
countervailing factors at work affecting respective the supply-side and the demand-side of
the economy.
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Monetary policy is often assigned a key role in stabilization programs in developing
countries, and the relationship between monetary variables and the business cycle has
become a topic of interest. A large literature has evolved around the question whether
money causes output, and a positive correlation between money variables and output
exists in industrialized countries. For Sub-Saharan African countries there are indications
of this feature. Generally, the correlation between output and M2 is positive for a majority
of the 20 African countries considered here, and this is so independent of the filter used.
A Granger causality test shows some indication of causality going from money to output,
but this result is very dependent on the choice of lags in the Granger causality procedure.
Furthermore in a number of countries we also find evidence of the opposite causation
from output to money. All in all we find little robust evidence for unidirectional Granger
causality from M2 to output in the Sub-Saharan African sample. So it is difficult to say on
this basis whether restrictive monetary policy may have had harmful real consequences or
whether monetary policy does not seem to affect output. In any case, the pro-cyclical
behavior of monetary aggregates should not be ignored as it does signal mutual
interdependence.
Another monetary aggregate considered here is domestic private sector credit. Equity
markets are weakly capitalized in most developing countries as compared with the
industrialized countries, and this is so in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa. Private sector
credit is therefore likely to play a critical role in determining investment and suggests that
overall economic activity is influenced by domestic private sector credit. There is some
indication of a pro-cyclical relationship between credit and output in the Sub-Saharan
African region. The correlations peak as in Agénor, McDermott and Prasad (2000) at a
zero lag, maybe indicating that the availability of domestic credit affects activity fairly
rapidly. A Granger causality test indicates that it is very difficult to make a robust
statement as regards the causality between private sector credit and output, as was the
case for the other monetary aggregate M2. Regardless of the Granger causality test the
positive association between private sector credit and domestic activity has important
implications for the design of stabilization programs. Ignoring this link may exacerbate
the output cost of a restrictive monetary policy aimed at lowering inflation.
A substantial literature documents the counter-cyclical behavior of prices in industrialized
countries, and it is typically argued that this negative relationship provides support for
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supply driven interpretations of the business cycle, including real business cycle models.
The correlation between the consumer price index and output in our Sub-Saharan African
sample is divided into two groups. Half the countries show pro-cyclical and half counter-
cyclical behavior. Thus the African sample is not in accordance with the consistent
negative pattern between output and prices in industrialized countries. It therefore appears
that demand driven models of output should not be ruled out in the case of at least some
African countries, whereas the supply-side is critical in others. This reinforces the point
already made above about the need for careful attention to country specific circumstances
and to countervailing forces at work (on both the demand and the supply-side of the
economy) when for example a terms of trade shock hits.
The interpretation of the unconditional correlation between output and measures of the
real effective exchange rate (REER) is complicated. The short run relationship depends
crucially on the sources of the macroeconomic fluctuations. Nonetheless, unconditional
correlations may be useful for two reasons. First, the signs and magnitude of these
correlations could give an indication of the types of shocks that have dominated
fluctuations over a period of time. Second, the correlations could help in interpreting the
correlation between output and other trade related variables. In our sample, a clear picture
does not emerge when examining the cross correlation between REER and output. Some
countries provide evidence for a positive relationship and some show a generally negative
correlation. However, in many cases the correlations are not significantly different from
zero. This absence of a systematic relationship between REER and the business cycle is
consistent with the result obtained when analyzing industrialized and middle-income
countries, and it implies that policy analysis related to business cycles should not
overemphasize the effects of REER on the economy.
The correlation between Official Development Assistance (ODA) and GDP is also
documented in Table 7a and 7b. Pallage and Robe (2001) show that for a majority of the
Sub-Saharan African countries aid flows are pro-cyclical.13 This finding is not supported
by our analysis. Pallage and Robe (2001) note the magnitude of output fluctuations
                                                
13 Pallage and Robe (2001) base their analysis on both ODA commitments and disbursements. They generally find that
commitments are ”less clearly” pro-cyclical than disbursements. We find that commitments are either counter-cyclical or at
least do not provide any evidence for being pro-cyclical. As regards disbursements we find that commitments and
disbursements are highly correlated. Since commitment data are generally more reliable and better sourced than
disbursements, we find it justified to rely on the former in the present analysis.
18
experienced by African countries, and this may clearly be an important handicap for
economic growth. They further argue that the existence of strongly pro-cyclical aid flows
underpin the suggestion that aid may be harmful to growth in the African context. The
cyclical nature of aid flows is therefore of interest. From our analysis (where appropriate
filters are applied) it emerges that it is only in Congo that aid has been significantly pro-
cyclical. In other countries the correlation is either statistically insignificant or aid is
counter-cyclical.
Table 7.a. Cross correlations for Sub - Saharan Africa, HP
Gdp Abs Con Pco Pub Inv Imp Exp M2 Oda Tot Rer Cpi Cre Wag
Benin 1.00 0.75 0.67 0.61 0.41 0.26 0.52 0.56 -0.08 -0.41 -0.11 na na -0.09 na
Burkina F 1.00 0.80 0.66 0.61 0.38 0.42 0.34 -0.10 0.19 0.14 0.09 na na 0.27 na
Burundi 1.00 0.87 0.66 0.60 0..38 0.35 0.06 0.01 na -0.03 0.20 -0.34 -0.34 0.17 na
Cameroon 1.00 0.79 0.72 0.71 0.29 0.58 0.42 0.08 -0.02 -0.29 0.10 na na -0.03 na
Congo 1.00 0.94 0.87 0.81 0.01 0.37 0.82 0.59 na 0.53 0.11 na -0.58 na na
C. dIvoire 1.00 0.87 0.83 0.75 0.83 0.61 0.60 -0.47 0.58 0.02 0.49 0.36 0.32 0.35 na
Gabon 1.00 0.95 0.08 -0.27 0.70 0.88 0.84 0.72 0.47 -0.11 0.16 -0.13 0.31 0.24 na
Gambia 1.00 -0.18 -0.21 -0.18 -0.29 0.23 0.06 0.59 -0.01 -0.27 -0.39 -0.07 0.23 0.10 na
Ghana 1.00 0.87 0.90 0.87 0.25 0.34 0.52 0.23 0.35 0.17 0.05 -0.30 -0.10 0.27 na
Kenya 1.00 0.72 0.83 0.86 0.03 0.19 0.24 -0.18 0.40 0.37 -0.18 0.35 -0.46 0.50 na
Madagasc. 1.00 0.94 0.83 0.82 0.65 0.84 0.71 0.47 0.14 0.36 -0.15 -0.01 -0.23 0.30 na
Malawi 1.00 0.74 0.82 0.75 -0.10 0.22 0.35 0.29 0.45 0.10 0.10 na na 0.18 na
Mali 1.00 0.88 0.81 0.80 0.29 0.41 -0.01 0.40 0.23 -0.27 0.62 na na -0.00 na
Niger 1.00 0.77 0.67 0.60 0.43 0.55 0.17 0.09 0.45 0.06 0.13 0.26 0.04 0.35 na
Nigeria 1.00 0.28 0.26 0.30 -0.06 0.22 0.16 0.66 0.13 0.23 0.12 -0.17 -0.16 0.07 na
Rwanda 1.00 0.91 0.88 0.75 0.74 0.37 -0.24 0.77 0.54 -0.74 -0.19 na na 0.35 na
Senegal 1.00 0.83 0.63 0.64 0.10 0.61 0.43 0.79 0.13 -0.28 -0.32 0.09 0.26 -0.10 na
S. Africa 1.00 0.99 0.84 0.83 0.20 0.95 0.95 -0.22 0.57 na 0.24 0.28 -0.02 na na
Zambia 1.00 0.41 0.36 0.34 -0.18 0.32 0.11 -0.08 na -0.26 0.07 na na na na
Zimbabwe 1.00 0.93 0.33 0.28 0.20 0.52 na na na 0.32 na 0.03 -0.52 na na
Notes: See Table 6.a.
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Table 7.b Cross Correlations for Sub - Saharan Africa, BP
Gdp Abs Con Pco Pub Inv Imp Exp M2 Oda Tot Rer Cpi Cre Wag
Benin 1.00 0.78 0.62 0.70 -0.08 0.16 0.46 0.54 -0.20 -0.50 0.05 na na -0.19 na
Burkina F 1.00 0.75 0.57 0.51 0.35 0.55 0.19 -0.08 -0.08 0.21 -0.18 na na 0.03 na
Burundi 1.00 0.85 0.62 0.59 0.24 0.39 -0.13 -0.08 na -0.19 0.31 -0.20 -0.37 0.32 na
Cameroon 1.00 0.74 0.66 0.68 0.10 0.62 0.27 0.04 0.17 -0.11 -0.01 na na 0.07 na
Congo 1.00 0.88 0.71 0.42 0.13 0.43 0.68 0.30 na 0.31 0.06 na -0.14 na na
C. dIvoire 1.00 0.81 0.76 0.67 0.76 0.49 0.22 -0.53 0.18 -0.31 0.37 -0.02 -0.13 -0.03 na
Gabon 1.00 0.92 0.03 -0.16 0.53 0.80 0.61 0.42 0.26 -0.22 0.22 -0.25 0.13 -0.00 na
Gambia 1.00 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.21 0.06 0.01 0.44 -0.04 -0.16 -0.17 -0.01 0.13 0.12 na
Ghana 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.30 0.55 0.64 -0.11 0.12 -0.17 -0.03 -0.10 0.06 0.21 na
Kenya 1.00 0.60 0.76 0.76 0.33 -0.07 0.05 -0.10 0.12 0.02 -0.02 0.16 -0.19 0.08 na
Madagasc. 1.00 0.94 0.84 0.82 0.50 0.79 0.68 0.43 0.21 0.19 -0.17 0.28 -0.10 0.58 na
Malawi 1.00 0.71 0.78 0.76 -0.26 0.18 0.26 0.18 0.57 -0.04 0.07 na na 0.15 na
Mali 1.00 0.85 0.78 0.77 0.17 0.32 -0.10 0.18 0.17 -0.25 0.53 na na 0.05 na
Niger 1.00 0.74 0.70 0.65 0.49 0.44 0.05 -0.19 0.04 0.38 0.15 -0.23 -0.12 0.23 na
Nigeria 1.00 0.23 0.08 0.15 -0.24 0.22 0.14 0.66 0.17 -0.01 0.30 0.07 -0.17 0.01 na
Rwanda 1.00 0.92 0.88 0.70 0.81 0.53 -0.30 0.72 0.74 -0.75 -0.25 na na 0.44 na
Senegal 1.00 0.81 0.66 0.65 0.11 0.55 0.14 0.71 0.14 -0.33 -0.45 0.18 0.20 -0.05 na
S. Africa 1.00 0.99 0.81 0.78 0.33 0.97 0.95 -0.21 0.37 na 0.24 0.11 -0.13 na na
Zambia 1.00 0.25 0.24 0.35 -0.36 0.26 -0.10 -0.04 na -0.48 0.11 na na na na
Zimbabwe 1.00 0.86 0.32 0.28 0.10 0.54 na na na 0.16 na -0.35 -0.58 na na
Notes: See Table 6.a.
(b)   Latin America
In Table 8a and 8b we document the set of stylized business cycle facts covering 15
indicators in 15 Latin American countries during the period 1967-97. Our summery
statistics show (in contrast to those of Pallage and Robe, 2001, but in line with for
example those of Agénor, McDermott and Prasad, 2000) that GDP for most of the
countries in this region is not more volatile during the business cycle than what is
typically observed in industrialized countries. While mechanisms for stabilizing business
cycle fluctuations may well be weaker in Latin America than in industrialized countries,
we argue that this cannot be concluded from GDP data only.
Turning to consumption, both total and private consumption are generally more volatile
than output. This is opposite to what is observed in developed countries, but it is in line
with the data for Sub-Saharan Africa that – as discussed above – indicate that the
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permanent income hypothesis is unlikely to hold. It would therefore appear that also in
Latin America there are difficulties in smoothening consumption during the business
cycle. Investment patters, however, seem more in line with what is documented for
industrialized countries. The relative volatility between investment and output in our
sample is about two to five, a range that corresponds well with what has been found in
developed countries.14
Another Latin American business cycle characteristic is that money supply is highly
volatile, as is the case in developing countries more generally. The standard deviation of
M2 in Latin American countries appears a little higher than what is observed in the other
regions analyzed in this paper. One likely cause for this is that seignorage is a much more
important source of government income in developing countries during recession periods
than in industrialized countries. The M2 indicator is therefore not geared as closely to the
stabilization objective as in developed countries.
Official development assistance is highly volatile in Latin America. The average standard
deviation across countries is even higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is in
accordance with Pallage and Robe (2001). Given the relatively small size of ODA relative
to GDP in Latin America, it would appear that the impact of ODA volatility should in all
likelihood not be overemphasized.
Finally, it is well known that many countries in Latin America experienced hyperinflation
during the period under study. This is also reflected in our data. Standard deviations in
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru stand out with particularly large fluctuations when
analyzing this cyclical component. The inflation characteristic is clearly an indicator
where Latin America is different.
                                                
14 The exact magnitude of the relative volatility depends crucially on the investment measure used.
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Table 8.a. Standard deviations for Latin America, HP, percent
Gdp Abs Con Pco Pub Inv Imp Exp M2 Oda Tot Rer Cpi Cre Wag
Argentina 4.29 5.64 4.98 na na 11.61 20.86 8.20 28.97 27.23 7.20 29.12 72.09 20.89 na
Bolivia 2.34 2.95 2.43 na 4.18 11.76 10.45 9.02 23.56 16.91 na 8.20 88.69 16.22 na
Brazil 3.32 3.68 2.48 3.31 7.44 9.00 8.48 6.43 21.27 61.62 8.51 na na 29.59 na
Chile 5.12 9.09 8.50 9.77 3.59 20.67 16.68 7.57 29.25 128.93 11.52 15.57 39.85 25.81 na
Columbia 1.47 2.39 1.47 1.38 4.50 7.54 9.84 6.58 7.37 26.62 7.80 5.55 3.44 na na
Dom Rep. 2.45 3.71 5.06 4.13 11.79 10.15 13.28 11.22 15.12 79.58 8.83 12.54 9.28 16.28 na
Ecuador 3.44 3.37 2.31 1.72 6.80 9.34 8.10 15.39 11.04 20.66 12.64 7.58 7.80 14.36 na
El Salvad. 4.16 5.99 5.14 5.90 9.01 13.59 10.94 10.07 5.55 15.27 13.93 7.81 4.11 8.41 na
Guatamala 2.00 2.57 1.84 1.80 3.80 11.48 10.41 5.88 9.83 18.85 6.67 7.06 6.81 11.22 na
Haiti 3.52 4.33 3.77 na na 13.96 15.52 20.27 8.78 35.61 14.61 9.20 6.80 16.77 na
Honduras 2.90 4.54 3.09 3.24 6.00 15.27 8.43 5.97 6.68 18.97 7.77 8.31 4.89 8.33 na
Mexico 2.92 4.87 3.34 3.52 2.40 11.26 17.51 5.81 24.48 35.83 8.64 11.29 15.10 29.07 13.63
Paraguay 3.41 6.69 6.29 6.76 11.04 11.68 19.89 13.94 14.98 21.64 15.16 10.02 5.47 16.23 na
Peru 5.32 8.04 5.71 5.66 7.69 21.20 12.81 6.91 17.70 18.02 10.32 12.91 86.85 20.10 na
Uruguay 4.55 6.92 5.67 6.32 4.55 15.62 11.28 6.27 20.74 37.45 9.78 13.73 13.65 20.55 na
Notes: See Table 6.a.
Table 8.b. Standard deviations for Latin America, BP, percent
Gdp Abs Con Pco Pub Inv Imp Exp M2 Oda Tot Rer Cpi Cre Wag
Argentina 2.71 3.42 2.89 na na 6.78 11.15 5.14 17.02 19.58 4.54 17.71 32.26 12.34 na
Bolivia 0.87 1.55 1.16 na 2.59 7.29 5.70 5.29 10.98 12.27 na 5.91 36.19 11.62 na
Brazil 1.60 1.77 1.60 2.11 4.25 4.07 4.98 4.65 13.26 49.57 4.70 na na 20.15 na
Chile 2.54 4.61 4.67 5.37 2.22 13.78 8.59 4.47 12.81 95.26 6.92 9.05 12.10 11.46 na
Columbia 0.62 1.09 0.62 0.62 2.45 3.88 4.24 3.79 3.37 18.53 5.38 2.77 1.52 na na
Dom Rep. 1.51 2.60 3.80 3.26 6.99 6.89 8.32 7.76 12.36 62.34 6.58 8.67 4.58 12.68 na
Ecuador 2.06 2.01 1.03 0.78 3.63 7.07 5.58 8.08 6.34 13.36 8.56 4.05 3.53 5.82 na
El Salvad. 1.51 2.49 2.17 2.76 5.41 8.19 5.49 7.27 2.10 10.61 9.44 5.65 2.01 4.69 na
Guatamala 0.82 1.41 0.77 0.74 2.33 8.17 6.49 3.46 6.40 9.55 4.22 4.72 3.60 7.28 na
Haiti 2.08 3.08 2.92 na na 8.13 11.70 13.63 4.81 21.50 8.59 4.86 3.05 7.18 na
Honduras 1.49 2.55 1.95 2.15 3.59 9.38 4.77 3.57 3.73 13.96 4.63 5.71 2.54 3.89 na
Mexico 1.45 2.55 1.57 1.69 1.36 6.67 9.09 2.57 11.08 25.42 4.89 7.20 6.64 15.74 5.72
Paraguay 1.44 4.41 4.67 5.24 6.34 6.18 13.81 9.63 5.80 15.80 12.13 7.21 2.78 6.15 na
Peru 2.80 4.23 2.88 2.94 4.15 10.50 7.03 4.78 10.45 11.70 7.30 7.06 32.15 10.68 na
Uruguay 1.85 2.84 2.53 2.83 3.31 6.02 4.90 3.37 8.85 22.86 5.82 7.22 5.45 10.83 na
Notes: See Table 6.a.
Analyzing second moments for the Latin American sample (Table 9a and 9b) shows that
all countries in the sample, except Ecuador, have positive correlations between output, on
the one hand, and total and private consumption, on the other, and signs are not that
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different when compared to developed countries. Ecuador shows signs of counter-cyclical
consumption when considering the BP-filtered time series, but Ecuador is an outlier when
considering almost any of the indicators analyzed here.
The correlation between government expenditure and GDP is positive, a relatively robust
result across the sample. The counter-cyclical government role when it comes to
government expenditure is not present in the Latin American data, in line with results
obtained when analyzing developed countries.
Investment is strongly, and positively correlated with GDP for all countries in the Latin
American sample (except Ecuador), a finding similar to that of developed countries. It is
not documented here, but the correlation between investment and output peaks at time
zero for almost all countries in the sample. This finding is identical to what is observed
for the US economy, but in European countries this correlation peaks with a lag. When
building applied models, this is critical for the choice of discount rates and demonstrates
the importance of deriving stylized facts as argued by Lucas (1981).
Indicators concerning international trade in the Latin American sample show that the
trade balance can in general be thought of as counter-cyclical. Imports are significantly
pro-cyclical for most of the countries considered, reflecting that economic activity in
small open economies is generally import-dependent. Exports for most of the countries in
the sample are also pro-cyclical. This is in contrast with industrialized countries, and may
well reflect export promotion policies in Latin America in the later part of the period
studied here. Notable exceptions are Ecuador, Guatemala, and Haiti, with Ecuador
showing signs of strongly pro-cyclical behavior of the trade balance.
Generally, one would expect positive correlation between the terms of trade and GDP.
While there is some indication hereof in the Latin American sample it is far from robust.
Ecuador stands out again together with Haiti with a significant and negative relationship.
However, for at least six countries (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Honduras, and the
Dominican Republic) in the sample terms of trade disturbances seem to have contributed
significantly to business cycle fluctuations in the respective countries. Argentina is almost
in this group. Yet, the level of significance is nevertheless just below the level of 0.26
used here. The real effective exchange rate (REER) also shows signs of a positive
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relationship, indicating that the exchange rate tends to appreciate when the cyclical
component of output goes up. Nevertheless, in nine out of the 15 countries in the sample
the sign is insignificant. This reflects that the short run effects of REER fluctuations
depends on the exchange rate arrangement in the individual countries that also vary over
time, and it is difficult in the present data to derive general region specific conclusions
about the effects of REER on output fluctuations.
The correlation between money and output is generally positive in Latin America,
independent of the filter used. This result is in line with results obtained for developed
countries. The issue whether money causes output or vice versa continues to loom in the
background. A situation where the pattern of lead and lag correlations shows positive
correlation between money and output that peaks with a lag is sometimes interpreted as an
indication of the speed with which changes in the monetary policy is transmitted to real
activity. In the Latin American countries these peak positive correlations occur with no or
only one lag. This indicates a short transmission period of monetary shocks to real output.
And Granger-causality tests provide some evidence that money Granger-causes output,
although the result is not unidirectional.
Another monetary aggregate to be considered is domestic private credit. In Latin America
there seems to be a fairly strong positive relationship between private credit and output,
where the correlations peak at time zero. This might reflect the speed with which changes
in domestic sector credit impacts on economic activity. Agénor, McDermott and Prasad
(2000) did Granger-causality tests to measure whether private sector credit has any
predictive power on industrial output. They found that for some countries domestic
private credit can predict output fluctuations in a Granger-causal sense. This is confirmed
in our data, but the robustness of the result is questionable. All in all, the general positive
link between domestic private credit and output in Latin America should certainly be kept
in mind when designing stabilization programs.
Traditional Keynesian models in which nominal wages are fixed have over the past three
decades been heavily criticized by new classical theory. Moreover, data for industrialized
countries do seem to indicate that real wages are pro-cyclical in contrast to the prediction
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of the traditional Keynesian approach.15  A priori we would expect the nominal wage
index to exhibit a pattern similar to that of the CPI due to, for example, contractual
indexing of wages. However, wage indexation data are extremely scarce in our sample. In
Mexico for which we do have information both nominal wages and prices are strongly
counter-cyclical, and the correlation between real wages and output is positive. The
traditional Keynesian model does not seem to stand up based on our data. Mexican data
also show - like in most other countries in the region - a negative relationship between
CPI and GDP. This suggests that a supply driven model may be the more appropriate
choice as in the case of industrialized countries. On the other hand, general regional
specific statements are not feasible due to the lack of data.
Finally, the correlation between ODA and GDP documented for Latin America in Table
9a and 9b shows no pattern. Most correlations are insignificant, and only Honduras has a
significant correlation (negative) when both filters are considered. There is no support in
our data for concluding that ODA is pro-cyclical in Latin America.
Table 9.a. Cross Correlations for Latin America, HP
Gdp Abs Con Pco Pub Inv Imp Exp M2 Oda Tot Rer Cpi Cre Wag
Argentina 1.00 0.99 0.93 na na 0.88 0.83 -0.53 0.74 0.05 0.23 0.44 -0.52 0.36 na
Bolivia 1.00 0.64 0.73 na 0.47 0.46 0.36 0.45 0.25 0.23 na 0.16 -0.25 0.22 na
Brazil 1.00 0.99 0.84 0.82 0.63 0.92 0.70 0.08 0.50 0.04 0.37 na na -0.05 na
Chile 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.91 0.63 0.63 0.93 0.16 0.69 0.18 0.58 0.61 -0.51 0.64 na
Columbia 1.00 0.64 0.87 0.84 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.54 0.30 -0.04 -0.07 0.21 -0.24 na na
Dom Rep. 1.00 0.85 0.61 0.62 0.03 0.66 0.55 0.34 0.19 0.05 0.40 -0.12 -0.54 0.27 na
Ecuador 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.85 0.26 0.02 -0.44 0.29 0.16 0.04 na
El Salvad. 1.00 0.91 0.90 0.82 0.36 0.73 0.84 0.41 0.40 -0.45 0.43 0.06 0.12 0.24 na
Guatamala 1.00 0.84 0.94 0.96 0.47 0.50 0.69 0.72 0.03 0.15 0.05 -0.12 0.31 0.12 na
Haiti 1.00 0.81 0.75 na na 0.63 0.67 0.81 0.57 -0.30 -0.49 0.38 -0.31 0.41 na
Honduras 1.00 0.76 0.65 0.64 0.26 0.62 0.64 0.61 0.37 -0.25 0.43 0.11 -0.43 0.24 na
Mexico 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.70 0.89 0.84 0.16 0.89 0.29 0.86 0.75 -0.68 0.88 -0.51
Paraguay 1.00 0.74 0.52 0.47 0.40 0.85 0.56 0.14 0.41 -0.10 0.09 0.06 0.49 0.51 na
Peru 1.00 0.93 0.86 0.87 0.64 0.70 0.69 -0.13 0.30 -0.40 0.08 0.11 -0.70 0.17 na
Uruguay 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.90 0.55 0.89 0.89 0.24 0.67 0.56 0.21 0.75 0.28 0.58 na
Notes: See Table 6.a.
                                                
15 New-Keynesian business cycle models exhibiting monopolistic competition in both commodity and labor
markets have in recent years been developed to capture the pro-cyclical nature of real wages (see Benhabib
and Farmer (1994 and 1996).
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Table 9.b. Cross Correlations for Latin Americ, BP
Gdp Abs Con Pco Pub Inv Imp Exp M2 Oda Tot Rer Cpi Cre Wag
Argentina 1.00 0.99 0.95 na na 0.90 0.84 -0.49 0.60 0.14 0.20 0.38 -0.55 0.39 na
Bolivia 1.00 0.52 0.48 na 0.50 0.42 0.17 0.14 0.10 -0.21 na 0.17 -0.08 0.06 na
Brazil 1.00 0.97 0.78 0.73 0.42 0.78 0.47 -0.02 0.18 -0.09 0.25 na na -0.06 na
Chile 1.00 0.94 0.86 0.86 0.53 0.33 0.88 0.39 0.42 0.05 0.32 0.44 -0.27 0.48 na
Columbia 1.00 0.58 0.75 0.77 0.01 0.40 0.34 0.34 0.41 0.06 0.03 0.13 -0.39 na na
Dom Rep. 1.00 0.83 0.55 0.56 -0.18 0.66 0.51 0.15 0.28 0.04 0.26 0.16 -0.50 0.27 na
Ecuador 1.00 -0.09 -0.08 0.10 -0.24 -0.03 -0.29 0.86 0.22 -0.16 -0.44 0.23 -0.05 -0.01 na
El Salvad. 1.00 0.69 0.68 0.59 0.11 0.34 0.67 0.45 0.20 -0.12 -0.02 0.09 -0.20 0.05 na
Guatemala 1.00 0.76 0.88 0.93 0.25 0.47 0.61 0.45 0.26 -0.09 0.15 0.16 -0.11 0.38 na
Haiti 1.00 0.79 0.74 na na 0.52 0.67 0.75 0.44 -0.22 -0.42 0.42 0.08 0.27 na
Honduras 1.00 0.61 0.55 0.56 0.06 0.41 0.40 0.49 0.52 -0.30 0.07 0.24 -0.53 0.38 na
Mexico 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.61 0.93 0.85 -0.25 0.82 0.04 0.71 0.70 -0.55 0.82 -0.37
Paraguay 1.00 0.60 0.43 0.41 0.11 0.69 0.32 -0.40 -0.19 0.02 0.31 -0.25 0.33 -0.10 na
Peru 1.00 0.92 0.86 0.85 0.57 0.75 0.75 0.04 0.15 -0.14 0.08 0.28 -0.42 0.07 na
Uruguay 1.00 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.32 0.74 0.75 0.17 0.48 0.25 0.13 0.52 0.21 0.29 na
Notes: See Table 6.a.
(c)  Asia and North Africa
Turning to the analysis of the standard deviations for the Asian and North African
countries, Table 10a and 10b show that the volatility in GDP is generally not significantly
different for what is observed in developed countries. The data analysis also shows that a
downward adjustment in the standard deviations for Asian countries, when using the BP-
filter instead of the HP-filter, is more pronounced than for North African countries. This
highlights once again the importance of using appropriate filters before drawing any final
conclusions about business cycle properties of a particular country.
In the Asian and North African group of countries some can be thought of as behaving in
accordance with the permanent income hypothesis. Half have standard deviations in both
total consumption and private consumption that are less volatile than GDP. The
consumption volatility in the Philippines for example is only half of the standard
deviation in GDP. For this group of countries it therefore generally seems as if business
cycle consumption patterns are better in accordance with patterns in industrialized
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countries than in the other developing regions studied in this paper. Moreover, the relative
volatility in investment to GDP also follows that of the developed countries. The standard
deviation in investment is two to five times the volatility in GDP.
Money aggregates also seem to be relatively well in concordance with the stylized facts of
industrialized countries. M2 is a bit more volatile than what is observed in industrialized
countries, but the standard deviation of this indicator is lower than in other developing
countries. Concerning private credit, only India stands out significantly with reported
standard deviations of 45.35% (HP) and 35.12% (BP), respectively. The rest of the Asian
and North African countries have low standard deviations as compared to other
developing countries.
The volatility in the CPI follows the above pattern. The documented figures are above
what is observed in developed countries, but below what is seen in other developing
countries. The volatility in wages is documented for two countries (Korea and Sri Lanka)
and there is no significant indication whether wages are more or less volatile than
consumer prices. It would seem that these indicators have quite similar business cycle
properties. Effective contractual indexing of nominal wages to the consumer price index
could lead to a situation where the business cycle features of wages closely follow that of
the CPI.
Finally, the volatility of ODA in this group of countries is also very high as was the case
in Latin America. However, it is once again important to keep in mind the relatively
minor significance of ODA as a share of GDP in the countries included in the present
Asian and North African sample.
All in all, the business cycle properties of the present sample with regard to volatility do
not deviate much from the summery statistics in industrialized countries.
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Table 10.a. Standard deviations for Asia and North Africa, HP, percent
Gdp Abs Con Pco Pub Inv Imp Exp M2 Oda Tot Rer Cpi Cre Wag
Algeria 3.55 3.96 3.29 3.40 4.78 7.42 10.14 6.56 10.59 18.11 16.52 na na 24.69 na
Bangladesh 3.67 4.17 4.80 4.83 4.68 16.58 17.80 11.71 na na 17.03 na 10.59 na na
China 2.94 4.11 2.66 2.56 4.89 7.87 16.16 9.51 na na 4.90 na na na na
Egypt 2.57 3.10 2.19 na na 11.74 7.34 6.85 6.76 36.88 10.67 19.18 2.16 13.10 na
India 2.34 2.48 na na 3.87 5.42 na na 6.65 20.88 7.32 6.09 5.13 45.35 na
Indonesia 1.33 3.91 4.51 5.27 4.69 5.56 7.73 6.05 9.22 16.92 10.01 9.05 5.37 16.15 na
Korea 2.50 3.00 1.85 2.14 2.25 9.19 6.32 7.22 8.80 122.00 3.58 5.83 4.94 9.17 5.84
Malaysia 2.30 6.16 4.25 4.84 4.56 11.43 9.46 3.92 6.16 42.25 5.55 5.14 2.94 10.49 na
Morocco 2.81 4.72 3.59 3.10 8.54 13.81 9.74 6.90 9.56 31.94 5.26 7.99 2.30 na na
Pakistan 1.62 3.58 2.62 3.22 5.46 2.99 12.13 9.17 11.45 22.35 10.46 10.00 4.54 11.71 na
Papua N.G. 4.17 5.28 3.54 4.22 3.83 19.17 8.98 10.81 na 11.10 8.76 na na na na
Philippines 3.37 4.63 1.78 1.60 4.39 13.10 9.81 7.79 7.91 23.27 5.69 7.27 6.47 15.93 na
Sri Lanka 1.35 3.30 3.44 3.92 6.51 10.72 7.51 4.94 7.25 13.05 12.00 8.37 4.64 7.41 7.05
Thailand 2.14 3.96 1.96 2.10 3.67 8.40 9.97 5.66 4.05 17.14 6.59 4.13 4.40 7.99 na
Tunisia 2.33 3.16 1.99 2.18 2.76 10.00 5.83 6.46 6.48 19.67 8.57 na na 6.31 na
Notes: See Table 6.a.
Table 10.b. Standard deviations for Asia and North Africa, BP, percent
Gdp Abs Con Pco Pub Inv Imp Exp M2 Oda Tot Rer Cpi Cre Wag
Algeria 2.84 2.67 2.23 2.41 3.32 4.90 6.59 5.36 6.90 12.16 10.65 na na 14.89 na
Bangladesh 2.41 2.74 3.47 3.49 3.29 11.96 13.47 9.30 na na 13.12 na 3.95 na na
China 1.52 2.18 1.23 1.24 2.47 4.48 9.38 4.82 na na 2.55 na na na na
Egypt 1.21 1.96 1.32 na na 5.86 4.70 3.97 3.67 28.39 4.97 8.76 1.36 7.31 na
India 1.50 1.69 na na 1.70 4.10 na na 3.07 15.73 5.38 3.46 2.70 35.12 na
Indonesia 0.84 2.26 2.88 3.45 3.37 2.37 4.53 3.89 5.46 7.81 6.06 4.64 2.57 9.77 na
Korea 1.37 1.69 0.99 1.22 1.28 5.51 3.93 4.84 4.26 78.51 2.04 2.49 2.33 4.39 1.96
Malaysia 1.28 2.83 1.84 2.27 2.22 6.19 5.51 2.96 2.95 27.67 4.52 2.68 1.35 6.07 na
Morocco 2.05 2.56 2.27 2.38 4.07 8.73 5.15 5.15 4.26 21.52 3.21 3.70 1.33 na na
Pakistan 1.13 2.44 1.93 2.39 4.00 2.02 7.70 6.30 5.57 15.45 7.17 6.22 1.87 5.91 na
Papua N.G. 1.96 2.91 2.07 2.57 3.10 10.49 5.53 4.72 na 7.71 6.60 na na na na
Philippines 1.43 2.03 0.62 0.54 2.06 6.71 3.90 5.04 3.76 15.52 3.62 4.48 4.17 6.88 na
Sri Lanka 0.74 1.88 2.01 2.45 4.18 6.84 3.99 3.73 5.29 9.09 7.17 4.78 2.09 6.07 4.03
Thailand 0.99 2.36 0.96 1.06 1.96 5.39 6.20 3.06 2.08 10.51 5.00 2.36 2.04 3.66 na
Tunisia 1.78 1.84 1.40 1.62 1.27 5.90 3.17 3.82 3.20 9.66 4.66 na na 3.48 na
Notes: See Table 6.a.
The contemporaneous correlations between GDP and the 14 other variables in this study
are documented in Table 11a and 11b for the 15 Asian and North African countries.
Except for Egypt there is significant positive correlation between output and total as well
as private consumption. Correlations are generally as high as documented for the US and
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European countries. As regards the stabilizing (counter-cyclical) impact of government
consumption there is no clear picture, and for three countries the sign of the correlation
changes from one filtering procedure to the other.
For most countries in the Asian and North African sample there is indication of a positive
and significant relationship between gross domestic investment and output. This is
independent of the filter used and corresponds well with what is observed in
industrialized countries. Besides Egypt, the only other countries with atypical
characteristics are Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka where the signs of contemporaneous
correlations change, depending on the filter used.
As regards the trade balance and output, our data do not provide a clear counter-cyclical
picture for the Asian and North African group. This is as discussed above in contrast with
the relationship in industrialized countries. Imports are, with the exception of Egypt,
positively correlated with output. However, exports are also highly positively correlated
with GDP, a feature that is not observed at this level in any developed countries. Export
promotion policies are in all likelihood one dimension of the underlying features captured
in this relationship. Looking at the terms of trade variable only two countries in the
sample show signs of a significantly positive time-series correlation with output,
independent of the filter applied. Terms of trade disturbances may, in other words, not
have been quite as an important source behind general output fluctuations in Asia and
North Africa as found by Hoffmeister and Roldos (1997) for Asia and Latin America.
Finally, it is difficult to identify any pattern in the relationship between the REER for
Asian and North African countries and output. Given the different exchange rate regimes
in place this result is not surprising, and generally corresponds well with what is observed
in developed countries.
The contemporaneous correlations between money and GDP suggest that for most of the
countries in the Asia/North Africa sample money is pro-cyclical. The only exceptions are
Morocco, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, when BP-filtered series are used. This again highlights
the potential importance of money when macroeconomic fluctuations of the business
cycle are under study. Our result is different from that of Agénor, McDermott and Prasad
(2000). They identify limited evidence in their sample of mainly middle-income countries
for pro-cyclical behavior of monetary aggregates. But it should be mentioned that a
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bivariate Granger-causality test provides no clear picture of whether M2 can be used for
predicting output. Turning to private sector credit there are also signs of a positive
relationship with output. This might indicate that credit has some predictive power when
trying to explain output fluctuations, but it could also be that the demand for loans is
determined by a set of other factors jointly determining credit and output. We recognize
that the two monetary aggregates considered here do not have the power to predict output
fluctuations in the Granger-causality sense. Yet, it is striking that so many countries show
significant positive correlations between output and monetary aggregates. It would
certainly appear justified to include monetary variables when modeling business cycles in
developing countries as long as it appears that money has real side effects in the business
cycle.
Negative correlations between the CPI and GDP in combination with nominal wages,
which are uncorrelated with GDP in Korea, provide no support for the wage indexing
hypothesis already referred to above. Data from Sri Lanka indicate the exact opposite
result with correlations for CPI and the wage index being almost identical. This is
regardless of the filter used. In sum, it would appear that a supply-side approach to
economic analysis with marginal productivity of labor equaling the real wage is more
appropriate in Korea than in Sri Lanka where real wages and output are approximately
uncorrelated. The lack of correlation in Sri Lanka can be explained with reference to an
efficiency wage-setting environment (see for example Danthine and Donaldson, 1990).
With reference, more specifically, to consumer prices in the Asian and North Africa group
no clear pattern seems to exist between CPI and GDP, which is contrary to results
documented for industrialized countries. Demand-driven models should not be ruled out a
priori when studying business cycles in developing countries.
Finally, no cyclical pattern between ODA and output in Asia and North Africa is evident
in our data, the only exception being Thailand. This result modifies the Pallage and Robe
(2001) conclusion that aid commitments are not counter-cyclical. We cannot rule out that
this may be so in the Asian and North African countries in our sample.
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Table 11.a. Cross Correlations for Asia and North Africa, HP
Gdp Abs Con Pco Pub Inv Imp Exp M2 Oda Tot Rer Cpi Cre Wag
Algeria 1.00 0.46 0.30 0.34 0.10 0.45 0.37 0.91 0.21 -0.20 0.02 na na 0.19 na
Bangladesh 1.00 0.95 0.76 0.76 0.65 0.61 0.49 0.40 na na 0.27 na -0.02 na na
China 1.00 0.94 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.88 0.54 0.14 na na -0.02 na na na na
Egypt 1.00 0.15 0.34 na na -0.00 -0.11 0.66 0.05 -0.11 -0.14 0.06 0.18 0.24 na
India 1.00 0.95 na na 0.42 0.56 na na 0.13 -0.21 0.25 0.05 -0.19 0.08 na
Indonesia 1.00 0.46 0.33 0.28 0.34 0.49 0.31 0.18 0.23 0.16 0.47 -0.04 0.11 -0.14 na
Korea 1.00 0.89 0.64 0.69 0.02 0.80 0.78 0.47 0.54 -0.06 0.65 0.43 -0.62 0.31 0.05
Malaysia 1.00 0.88 0.82 0.81 0.46 0.88 0.79 0.49 0.50 0.08 0.56 0.33 0.36 0.49 na
Morocco 1.00 0.81 0.85 0.79 0.61 0.44 0.54 0.18 0.15 0.28 -0.11 0.15 0.07 na na
Pakistan 1.00 0.62 0.68 0.68 -0.15 0.38 0.36 0.52 0.20 0.13 -0.08 0.39 -0.06 0.19 na
Papua N.G. 1.00 0.31 0.76 0.68 0.64 -0.13 0.08 0.66 na -0.33 0.28 na na na na
Philippines 1.00 0.94 0.91 0.90 0.73 0.89 0.86 0.64 0.70 -0.01 -0.16 0.19 -0.63 0.76 na
Sri Lanka 1.00 0.62 0.38 0.42 -0.15 0.36 0.51 0.37 0.09 0.13 -0.02 -0.09 0.24 0.09 0.28
Thailand 1.00 0.84 0.80 0.78 0.37 0.82 0.73 0.51 0.45 0.51 0.12 0.15 -0.07 0.69 na
Tunisia 1.00 0.64 0.33 0.36 0.06 0.53 0.20 0.33 0.15 -0.04 0.19 na na 0.13 na
Notes: See Table 6.a.
Table 11.b. Cross Correlations for Asia and North Africa, BP
Gdp Abs Con Pco Pub Inv Imp Exp M2 Oda Tot Rer Cpi Cre Wag
Algeria 1.00 0.36 0.27 0.31 0.04 0.32 0.30 0.93 0.21 -0.19 -0.13 na na 0.08 na
Bangladesh 1.00 0.92 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.58 0.34 0.33 na na 0.14 na 0.15 na na
China 1.00 0.87 0.56 0.56 0.28 0.86 0.36 -0.02 na na 0.11 na na na na
Egypt 1.00 -0.02 0.18 na na -0.06 -0.17 0.58 0.20 0.00 -0.05 0.17 0.13 0.05 na
India 1.00 0.95 na na 0.15 0.49 na na 0.06 -0.06 0.13 0.25 0.10 0.36 na
Indonesia 1.00 0.35 0.32 0.31 -0.02 0.21 0.20 0.30 0.15 0.02 0.25 0.07 0.27 -0.13 na
Korea 1.00 0.90 0.61 0.72 -0.33 0.79 0.83 0.43 0.69 -0.12 0.56 0.47 -0.60 0.46 -0.10
Malaysia 1.00 0.74 0.57 0.62 -0.02 0.75 0.63 0.64 0.44 -0.02 0.75 0.35 0.21 0.31 na
Morocco 1.00 0.80 0.82 0.76 0.45 0.25 0.37 0.36 -0.03 0.14 -0.13 -0.03 0.05 na na
Pakistan 1.00 0.63 0.70 0.67 -0.07 0.43 0.33 0.35 -0.26 0.11 0.10 0.38 0.32 -0.14 na
Papua N.G. 1.00 0.32 0.46 0.31 0.54 0.04 0.12 0.63 na -0.14 0.03 na na na na
Philippines 1.00 0.78 0.76 0.78 0.48 0.81 0.68 0.45 0.40 0.17 -0.21 -0.22 -0.68 0.48 na
Sri Lanka 1.00 0.29 0.39 0.44 -0.36 -0.06 0.13 0.28 -0.12 0.17 -0.16 -0.01 0.34 -0.17 0.23
Thailand 1.00 0.73 0.54 0.49 0.29 0.78 0.53 0.05 0.25 0.27 0.38 0.13 0.01 0.69 na
Tunisia 1.00 0.73 0.18 0.18 0.08 0.62 0.27 0.56 0.17 0.06 0.30 na na 0.08 na
Notes: See Table 6.a.
V.   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The design of appropriate stabilization policies in developing countries has attracted a lot
of attention during the past two decades, almost to the extent that macroeconomic
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stabilization and adjustment became synonymous with economic development. This is
unfortunate for a number of reasons. Proper macroeconomic management is critical, but
clearly only one item on the complex agenda facing policy makers in the third world and
donor agencies. Moreover, Lucas (1981) argues that understanding the characteristics of
the business cycle is the first step in designing appropriate stabilization policies. We have
documented in this paper that this preparatory work is as yet far from complete. This is so
in spite of the insightful contribution by Agénor, McDermott and Prasad (2000), who
explicitly recognize their limited country coverage.
First, we found no evidence in the literature of any serious attention to the importance of
the duration of the business cycle for the conclusions drawn about stylized facts. Second,
based on a sample of 15 countries we estimated that the duration of business cycles in
developing countries are clearly shorter than those in developed countries, and also the
turning points vary. Business cycles in developing countries are different. Thirdly, we
applied appropriate filters to capture a business cycle duration of no more than six years
to a sample of 50 countries, including both low- and middle-income countries. It emerged
that previous insights need considerable qualification.
The following conclusions stand out as regards the volatility of the 15 variables
considered:
• Output is much more volatile in Sub-Saharan Africa than in industrialized countries
and more volatile than in the Latin American, Asian and North African countries
studied here. The expectation that there are fewer automatic stabilizers in developing
countries seems to hold. Business cycle management is a greater challenge in
developing countries.
• Consumption is more volatile than output in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.
The permanent income hypothesis is – in contrast to findings for industrialized
countries – not supported by our data.
• Money and private sector credit are highly volatile across the three groups of
developing countries included here. Monetary policy is used to pursue other goals
than pure stabilization. This obviously makes stabilization an even more difficult task.
As regards cyclical properties, we conclude that:
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• Both consumption and investment are strongly pro-cyclical. This is not surprising but
has not so far been established in empirical studies for developing countries.
• Non-counter-cyclical government consumption is typical in all regions. Government
seems to have a limited stabilizing role on the economy. The need to develop ways
and means to change this situation remains a challenge in spite of the considerable
attention paid to this issue over the past decades.
• Asia and North African countries do not provide a clear counter-cyclical picture as
regards the trade balance due to strongly pro-cyclical exports. This is atypical both as
compared to industrialized countries, Sub-Saharan African and Latin American
countries. Deliberate economic policy does seem to interact with stylized facts.
• It is surprisingly difficult to identify any clear pattern as regards the terms of trade. It
appears that the terms of trade are not as significant a destabilizing factor as often
assumed.
• Money aggregates are generally pro-cyclical, but causality is unclear as is the case for
industrialized countries. Research should continue to try to uncover whether money
drives real variables or vice versa. However, the building of business cycle models
without attention to monetary variables is likely to miss the target.
• Consumer prices show no consistent cyclical pattern in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asian
and North African countries, but in Latin America the picture corresponds to the
counter-cyclical features observed in developed countries. Demand driven models of
the business cycle can largely be ruled out in Latin America, but not in the other
developing countries.
• Foreign aid shows no signs of being pro-cyclical. The general picture is mixed and it
does not seem warranted to conclude that aid exacerbates macroeconomic instability
with adjacent welfare costs. Our results appear in line with those of Hansen and Tarp
(2001), who argue that aid does seem in general to promote growth through savings-
investment-growth linkages rather than being harmful to growth.
The above summary makes it clear that Sub-Saharan Africa does seem to stand out,
whereas Asian and North African countries show business cycle properties more in line
with those of developed countries. Latin America falls in between. In some ways this
region resembles the developed world, but on other accounts, such as consumer prices,
they show very different characteristics.
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The empirical analyses of Agénor, McDermott and Prasad (2000) point to the importance
of supply-side shocks in driving the business cycles in developing countries, and their
results are in line with the numerical models put forward by Hoffmeister and Roldos
(1997) for Asia and Latin America and Hoffmeister, Roldos and Wickman (1997) for
Sub-Saharan Africa. They suggest that supply shocks are the main source of output
fluctuations in developing countries - even in the short run. Our empirical results provide
a more composite and complex picture of reality. On this basis, we would hesitate to rule
out demand driven models a priori in analyzing business cycle features in developing
countries. The choice of model should depend on country specific insights and
circumstances. To uncover these characteristics country studies and country specific
modeling are required.
In sum, business cycles in developing countries are different. This is so both for duration
and turning points as well as the stylized facts that characterize third world countries. We
argue that a wider range of theoretical models is required to fully understand the
properties of business cycles across the developing world. The developing countries are a
more diverse group than the rather uniform industrialized countries. This is yet another
dimension along which developing countries are indeed different.
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